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Since the 1980s, changes in government policy, including legislation
to enable third-party insurance contracting, increased levels of state
support for private health insurance, and public–private partnerships,1
have encouraged corporate investment into the hospitals, medical cen-
tres, pathology laboratories and diagnostic facilities of the Australian
healthcare system. Driven by the ‘new public management’ (NPM)
reform agenda (English 2005, p. 93), and in conformity with the con-
tradictory and crisis-driven nature of neoliberalism (Peck, Theodore
& Brenner 2012, p. 25), the government’s explicit agenda of privati-
sation and marketisation has profoundly altered the way the system
is financed and organised. The sector, once dominated by public and
not-for-profit, charity or religious institutions, with their own distinct
Collyer, F., Harley, K. & Short, S. 2015, ‘Money and markets in Australia’s healthcare
system’, in Markets, rights and power in Australian social policy, eds G. Meagher &
S. Goodwin, Sydney University Press, Sydney.
1 Public–private partnerships refer to the involvement of private consortia with
government to provide infrastructure and related services to the public. The origin
of these in Australia, in their current form, can be traced to the election of
conservative state governments in New South Wales (1989) and Victoria (1992)
(English 2005, p. 92).
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but complementary functions, has lost its universal character and been
transformed into a highly protected market system. This new system
has been very much a creation of government, intent on building pri-
vate healthcare and health insurance markets, and its presence raises
questions about the financial sustainability of a system which is largely
uncapped, and about the extent to which healthcare, driven by market
rather than medical considerations, can continue to deliver the high
quality, accessible healthcare services once envisaged under the concept
of Medibank.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the Australian health-
care system and relevant policies. This leads on to an exploration of the
history of private and public health insurance schemes, followed by the
history of private and public healthcare services. These narratives reveal
the extent to which the system has become corporatised and privatised,
demonstrating the connections between government policy, the entry
of corporate investment, the growth of for-profit organisations, and the
changing balance between the private and public sectors. The chapter
concludes by examining some of the implications of these changes for
the healthcare budget, for the effective planning and delivery of services
and for access to essential healthcare services for all Australians.
The Australian healthcare system
The Australian healthcare system is composed of both public and pri-
vate facilities, and public and private sector workforces, and funded
through a complex mix of Commonwealth and state government, cor-
porate, religious, philanthropic and individual sources. Citizens have
access to free medical care in public hospitals, and under the national,
compulsory health insurance scheme, Medicare, are provided with free
or subsidised access to doctors and various medical and health facilities
– even though many of these are in the private sector and charge
on a fee-for-service basis. The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme is also
universal and government-funded, providing patients with pharmaceu-
ticals from privately owned pharmacies at a significantly reduced cost
where these are recommended by a doctor and on the list of essential
medicines.
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The Commonwealth government supplies the funds for both
Medicare and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, thus providing the
bulk of funds for medical services occurring outside hospitals. State
and territory governments join with the Commonwealth to fund public
hospitals and community care for aged and disabled persons, while the
states and territories are the main providers for ambulance, public den-
tal services (most dental services are provided in the private sector and
are not subsidised), public health activities and community health ser-
vices. Government-owned and operated community health centres are
mostly found in locations that are not attractive to the private sector.
They do not charge patients for services or access to facilities.
The healthcare system has long been dominated by its large public
hospital sector, where most of the research and training is conducted
and the specialities of medicine are found (Productivity Commission
2009). These public hospitals provide both in-patient and out-patient
services at no charge to Australian citizens. However, the healthcare
system also includes an array of small and large private hospitals and
facilities (both religious not-for-profits, and corporate for-profits) that
patients can access through private health insurance or personal pay-
ment. The non-government, religious and charitable sector provides a
substantial level of residential aged care, but also a number of hospitals.
These services are mostly financed by government.
The funding of healthcare in Australia
In the latter half of the 19th century, healthcare services in Australia de-
veloped from their colonial, military roots into a heterogeneous system
funded from private, government, military and religious sources. Dur-
ing the first 60 years of the 20th century, several attempts were made
by Commonwealth governments to introduce funding reform into this
fragmented array of services. The first was in 1928 by Earle Page, a sur-
geon and Treasurer in the Country–Nationalist Coalition government
led by Stanley Bruce (1923–28). Page’s national insurance scheme for
maternity, old age, sickness and invalidity, based on compulsory con-
tributions from individuals and their employers, was thwarted by the
friendly societies (voluntary health insurance associations), employers
and doctors’ groups. A second proposal came in 1938 from Treasurer
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Richard Casey of the newly formed United Australia Party in the con-
servative government led by Joe Lyons (1932–39). This plan involved a
public insurance scheme funded out of the wage system, and was also
opposed by the medical profession, employers and even the Australian
Labor Party, with the latter insisting on public provision and arguing
contributions should not come from wages (Collyer 2012, p. 119).
In 1944, the Labor government created the Pharmaceutical Benefits
Act, which aimed to provide essential medicines free of charge. Doc-
tors, fearful of ‘civil conscription’ and the imposition of a ‘socialist’
health system styled on the British National Health Service, opposed
this Act. The matter ended in the High Court and led to a referendum
in 1946 to extend the Commonwealth’s powers to legislate on health-
care services. These powers remained limited, for the constitutional
amendment prohibited the government from requiring medical profes-
sionals ‘to work in a nationalised health or dental service’ (de Voe &
Short 2003, p. 348). Given the continuing opposition of doctors (or-
ganised at this time by an Australian branch of the British Medical
Association), and the newly formed conservative Liberal Party, the con-
sequence for the next few years was the operation of a very limited –
and patchy – national health program, with various subsidies offered to
some hospitals in some states for the treatment of some public patients.
Further reform to the system occurred in 1953 under a Lib-
eral–Country Party government, when Earle Page, this time as Minister
for Health, proposed an alternative, voluntary, government-sponsored
health insurance program in consultation with the medical profession.
The ‘Earle Page scheme’, as it came to be known, offered public in-
surance administered by private, non-profit funds. These benefits were
subsidised by the Commonwealth government and met part of the cost
of medical expenses. Tax deductions were also provided by the Menzies
Coalition government to assist with the cost of health insurance premi-
ums (Stebbing & Spies-Butcher 2010, p. 591). Nevertheless, healthcare
services during the 1950s and 1960s remained inaccessible to many
individuals, for the scheme required patients to purchase private insur-
ance before they could access government benefits. Indeed, the high
cost of services led to an accumulation of bad debts which then drove
up doctors’ fees, and resulted in 17 percent of Australians without med-
ical coverage. In 1968, the Committee of Inquiry into Health Insurance,
established by the Gorton Coalition government (1968–71), confirmed
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criticisms of the scheme’s failure to cover the entire population, the
often large gap between fees charged and insurers’ refunds, and the
program’s complexity and cost (Palmer & Short 2010, p. 61). The com-
mittee also pointed out that many of the insurance companies were not
only delivering substandard benefits, but appropriating an unreason-
ably high proportion of the contributions (de Voe & Short 2003, p. 349).
Ideas for alternative healthcare schemes were fiercely debated dur-
ing these years. In large part, this level of public discussion was made
possible by the expansion of the middle class, itself stimulated by
growth in the university sector where the new professions (such as
social work) and new disciplines (such as health economics, public
health and sociology) were beginning to make an impact in the Aus-
tralian setting (Collyer 2012, pp. 124–25). In opposition in 1969, the
Australian Labor Party sought to win over the public by promising to
mend the inefficiencies of Australia’s existing 78 private medical insur-
ance funds and 109 private hospital insurance funds, with a proposal
for a population-wide, compulsory health insurance program funded
from a health tax. The scheme, eventually called Medibank, drew heav-
ily on the work of economists Dick Scotton and John Deeble and was
put forward as a more equitable and efficient alternative, with patients’
costs proportional to incomes and multiple health funds replaced by
one government-administered fund (Palmer & Short 2010, p. 62).
Medibank: the national health insurance scheme
After Labor was elected at the 1972 federal election, the Whitlam gov-
ernment set about implementing this health insurance program. Again,
efforts to construct a national, publicly funded program were strongly
opposed: this time by the Australian Medical Association (AMA),2 pri-
vate health funds and the opposition political parties. The legislation to
introduce Medibank was twice rejected by the Senate but finally passed
after a dissolution of both houses of parliament, a federal election in
which health was again a major issue, and a joint sitting of both houses
2 Branches of the British Medical Association were formed in Australia in the
19th century, and these branches eventually merged to establish the AMA in 1962.
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to resolve the continuing deadlock over this and other legislation (Scot-
ton & Macdonald 1993).
Medibank commenced from mid-1975, beginning with the estab-
lishment of the Health Insurance Commission (HIC) on 1 July to ad-
minister this public medical insurance scheme. Unlike its proposed
precursors, the scheme was initially funded entirely from Common-
wealth revenue. Doctors were able to bill patients, or the HIC, and
accept 85 percent of the scheduled fee as full payment. Later that year
free medical care in public hospitals was made available under Med-
ibank, with patients still able to choose to be treated privately, because
private health insurance was also available to fund private patient costs
in either public or private hospitals (Palmer & Short 2010, p. 63). Under
Medibank, all Australians were for the first time provided with full ac-
cess to hospital care, subsidised for their essential medicines, and able
to access services (without cost, or with the assistance of a generous
subsidy), when visiting a general practitioner (GP) or having diagnostic
tests.
Immediately upon election in 1975, the Fraser Liberal–National
Party government commenced the dismantling of Medibank, allowing
individuals to opt out of the health tax by paying for private health
insurance, and imposing a levy of two point five percent of taxable in-
come for those covered only by the HIC. This was essentially a return
to the voluntary Earle Page scheme of the 1950s, for changes in 1981
directed Commonwealth subsidies only to those who paid to join pri-
vate health insurance funds (with contributions eligible for tax rebates),
and it thus eliminated free hospital treatment (Gray 1996, p. 592). These
were strong incentives to take out private health insurance coverage.
It was a policy designed to reverse the decline in fund membership
which had occurred since the introduction of Medibank (Palmer &
Short 2010, p. 63).
The Hawke Labor government (1983–91) re-introduced a tax-
funded public health insurance scheme on 1 February 1984. Like its
predecessor Medibank, it was administered by the HIC but renamed
Medicare Australia. In addition to general taxation revenue, the scheme
was funded from a one percent levy on taxable income, with lower
and upper limits.3 Fees for each specified service were set out in the
Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS), and insurance companies were not
allowed to offer ‘gap’ insurance to meet the difference between the
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scheduled fee and the actual fee charged by the doctor or hospital
(Palmer & Short 2010, pp. 63–64). On this occasion, opposition to the
introduction of Medicare from the medical profession was relatively
muted. Nonetheless Medicare, like Medibank before it, led to a decline
in the proportion of the population covered by private hospital insur-
ance, from above 55 percent in the early 1980s, to 48 percent in 1985
and 30 percent in 1998 (Harley et al. 2011). This decline was not con-
structed as a ‘policy problem’ until after the Liberal–National Coalition
government took office in 1996. Over the next 11 years, the Coalition
continued to ‘pay lip service’ to Medicare while focusing its efforts on
building a financially viable private health insurance sector.
The Coalition government re-built the private health insurance
sector by introducing a series of measures to encourage the uptake of
private health insurance, including both ‘carrots and sticks’ (Hall, de
Abreu Lourenco & Viney 1999). The ‘carrot’ of the Private Health In-
surance Incentives Scheme (PHIIS) subsidised the cost of premiums
for those with low incomes, while the ‘stick’ was the Medicare Levy
Surcharge: a one percent tax on high-income earners who did not pur-
chase cover. The combination of government measures, but especially
Lifetime Health Cover (Butler 2002), and the ‘fear factor’ about be-
ing uninsured (Deeble, in Gray 2004, p. 38), arrested and reversed the
decline in insurance membership rates. These lifted from a low of 32
percent for hospital insurance and 33 percent ancillary coverage in
March 2000, to 46 percent (hospital) and 41 percent (ancillary) in Sep-
tember 2000, and 45 percent (hospital) and 51 percent (ancillary) by
June 2009 (Harley et al. 2011, p. 308). In 1999, the PHIIS was extended
to a universal 30 percent private health insurance rebate (increased to
35 percent for individuals aged 65–69 years and 40 percent for those 70
years and older in 2005) (PHIAC 2009, p. 12; Kay 2007, p. 587).
Both the Liberal Coalition and Labor parties have shifted positions
on the role of Medicare and private health insurance. In the run-up
to the 1996 election, Liberal leader John Howard announced his new-
found support for Medicare, a strategic move which assisted the Liberal
Coalition to win government:
3 The Medicare levy has subsequently been increased to 1.5 percent and the
upper limit (of $700) removed.
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Medicare gives people a sense of security … when Medicare was
first introduced I was critical of it … But over the years people have
grown to support it … And there’s no law in politics that says that
you can’t over a period of time change your view about an issue
(Howard 1996, p. 9).
It was a new policy narrative, offering support for the public insurance
scheme but constructing the low rate of private health insurance mem-
bership as a ‘policy problem’ requiring an immediate solution (Elliot
2006, p. 133). Changes also occurred on the other side of politics. While
in opposition, Labor had opposed the Coalition’s private health insur-
ance incentive schemes. However, in the lead-up to the 2007 federal
election it committed to retaining the rebate (Biggs 2009, p. 4). Follow-
ing their election, the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments adopted
the language of ‘balance’ previously employed by the Coalition (Elliot
2006), calling for the rebate to be means-tested and proportionately re-
duced, and the Medicare Levy Surcharge increased for those on high
incomes. A 2009 budget announcement proposed the scheme would
be ‘re-balanced’ so that the highest income earners (around one in
10 adults) would ‘receive less “carrot” and more “stick” to be insured’
(Roxon & Swan 2009). Under this proposal, the private health insur-
ance rebate would no longer be available to the highest income tier, and
reduced (by 20 and 10 percent respectively) for the two tiers below;
conversely, the Medicare Levy Surcharge would be increased from one
percent to 1.5 and 1.25 percent respectively for the top two tiers.4 Leg-
islation to this effect was fiercely opposed by the Coalition opposition
and defeated in the Senate in 2009; however, the re-introduced Fairer
Private Health Insurance Incentives Bill 2011 (and related bills) were
passed in 2012. While this change removed or reduced the transfer of
public financial support for the highest income earners to purchase pri-
vate insurance, and reduced annual government expenditure by some
4 As a consequence of this legislation, citizens are eligible for a tax rebate
depending on their level of income, whether they have dependents, and whether
they are single. The threshold for payment varies each year, changing with the
growth in Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings. Information about the three
tiers of rebate can be found at Department of Human Services (n. d).
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$746.3 million in 2012–13, the rebate scheme preserves substantial
public funding of the private health insurance sector.
The private health insurance sector
The private health insurance sector is diverse, including small restricted
membership organisations (generally associated with a particular em-
ployer or union), the large and influential Blue Cross funds (until re-
cently HCF, HBA, HBF, Mutual Hospital and MBF), friendly societies,
regional hospital funds and, since the 1980s, commercial for-profit
funds and the national government fund, Medibank Private (the largest
insurer). While legislation to privatise Medibank Private was passed in
the final term of the Howard Coalition government, the sale was not
implemented. The Rudd Labor government transformed this into a ‘for-
profit’ entity with capacity to submit surpluses to Treasury (Shamsullah
2011, p. 27). In contrast, most of the Blue Cross funds were estab-
lished and run by healthcare providers (doctors, hospitals and asso-
ciated charities) with little contributor representation on their boards.
They have thus traditionally been seen as working in the interests of
providers, contributing to the cost control problems associated with
voluntary insurance (Shamsullah 2011, p. 26).
The 1990s and 2000s have seen significant consolidation of the pri-
vate health insurance sector, with 56 health benefits organisations (or
insurers) operating in 1989, 44 in 2001 and 34 in 2011 (Industry Com-
mission 1997, p. 97; PHIAC 2001, 2011). However, this consolidation
or concentration has not meant a diminishing commercialisation of
the sector. The overall number of for-profit organisations in the private
health insurance sector has varied since they were allowed to operate in
Australia after the introduction of Medicare (Shamsullah 2011, p. 27).
Indeed, the number of for-profit insurers fluctuated between two and
four during the 1990s (Industry Commission 1997), grew to six by 30
June 2001 (PHIAC 2001), increased to seven (of a total of 38 funds)
by 2008, nine (of 37) in 2009 and 10 in 2010, dropping back to seven
(of 34) in the next year with a number of mergers (PHIAC 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011). Nevertheless, there has been a significant growth in
the amount of business conducted by this commercial segment of the
insurance sector, for ‘the bulk of the health insurance business is now
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conducted by funds classed as “for-profit” ’ (Shamsullah 2011, p. 29).
These organisations include Medibank Private, the state-owned corpo-
ration with the largest market share (PHIAC 2011), followed closely by
BUPA (British United Provident Association), which provides health
insurance and healthcare service facilities in almost every country in
the world (BUPA 2012). This new concentration of private enterprise in
the health insurance sector is evident. At 30 June 2011, the seven for-
profit insurers had 69 percent of market share, up from 42 percent in
2009 (PHIAC 2009, 2011), and from less than 13 percent in 1997 (In-
dustry Commission 1997).
A protected industry
Private health insurance is an arena where we can see the direct cou-
pling of government policy to strategic, corporate investment. This can
be seen at the level of individual organisations as well as the indus-
try as a whole. Medibank Private, the for-profit with the largest market
share, for example, was created in 1976 and rapidly developed into the
largest fund by 1982. As a new fund, it attracted a younger, lower-risk
membership, but was advantaged from the start by its connection with
the government fund, Medicare. Administered by the same govern-
ment authority, the HIC, and able to share its shop front offices with
Medicare, the private company’s infrastructure costs were significantly
reduced (Shamsullah 2011, p. 27). Complaints from its competitors led
to the Howard government’s attempt to privatise the organisation, and
when this was unsuccessful, its eventual corporatisation. Medibank Pri-
vate’s initial market advantage has continued to assist its prosperity,
perhaps because it is still regarded by many members of the public as a
public entity. With regard to the private health insurance industry as a
whole, Shamsullah (2011, p. 23) argues it has ‘never been distinguished
by profit-driven firms competing whole-heartedly in a dynamic, free
market’. Indeed it has a unique position among industry sectors in
Australia, protected from market competition and market downturns
through government subsidies and a suite of legislation. The subsidy
itself is large. Through the Private Health Insurance Tax Rebate, sev-
eral billion dollars are shifted to the private health sector each year. In
2011–12, the subsidising of private health insurance amounted to $4.7
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billion (AIHW 2013a, p. 38). The figures for 1999–2010 are presented
in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Private health insurance subsidy, Australian Government 1999–2010
Year Health insurance premium rebates
($ million)
1999–00 1,576
2000–1 2,031
2001–2 2,118
2002–3 2,250
2003–4 2,387
2004–5 2,645
2005–6 2,883
2006–7 3,073
2007–8 3,587
2008–9 3,643
2009–10 4,262
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2011, p. 27. Table 3.5:
Funding of health expenditure by the Australian Government, current prices, by
type of expenditure.
Government legislation also protects this industry from market com-
petition. Aiming to ensure insurance products were accessible to all
(regardless of health status), the fair treatment of contributors and the
sound management of the funds; ‘competition between funds on price
and product innovation and differentiation has been deliberately stifled’
(Shamsullah 2011, p. 27). Government action has meant the indus-
try’s policies must comply with a comprehensive body of rules,5 and
its activities are intensively scrutinised by the Private Health Insurance
Administration Council (Shamsullah 2011, p. 27). Restrictions include
the inability to exclude high risk members, the provision of standard
5 The rules pertaining to the private health insurance industry can be found at
Department of Health (2011).
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statements of all policies, and price control. There is, consequently, little
differentiation between the funds.
One of the implications of state support for the private health in-
surance sector is that it translates into support – and profit – for private
providers of healthcare services. This is clearly seen in the increases in
net profits for the largest health service providers that immediately fol-
lowed the Howard government’s promotion of private health insurance.
These increases ranged from 34 percent for Healthscope to 142 per-
cent for Ramsay in 2000–1, and were attributed in their annual reports
to ‘improving market conditions associated with increases in private
health insurance coverage’ (Hopkins 2001, pp. 232–33). Indeed, the
private healthcare services sector, which includes the large for-profit
companies Ramsay Health Care and Healthscope, as well as the pri-
vate but not-for-profit Catholic Hospitals, benefit significantly from the
state promotion and subsidisation of private health insurance. Over a
12-month period, the private hospital sector alone expanded its bed
capacity by two percent to 28,351 and increased its income by nine
percent to $10.7 billion (2010–11 figures, ABS 2012). Although the
relationship between the private health insurance sector and the pri-
vate provision of healthcare services is a complex one, these figures are
indicative of the importance of private health insurance to the sustain-
ability of the private healthcare sector. This is particularly important
given that 37 percent of the funding for private hospitals is derived
from the state, including 21 percent from the private health insurance
rebate.6 We turn now to consider healthcare services provision.
The provision of healthcare services
During the 1980s and 1990s, the healthcare services landscape in Aus-
tralia began to radically alter as corporate players realised the potential
6 Private hospitals in Australia are funded from a variety of sources. In 2009–10,
the breakdown of its sources of funding was: health insurance funds (45 percent),
individuals (12 percent), other (six percent), and government (37 percent). This
latter figure is a combination of Department of Veteran Affairs (nine percent),
Australian government (three percent), rebates of health insurance premiums (21
percent), and state/territory governments (four percent) (AIHW 2012a, p. 4).
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for expansion of private healthcare and began to systematically enter
the market. This pattern, of significant government funding for health-
care services followed by a heightening of corporate and investor in-
terest, is not unique to Australia. It also occurred, for instance, in the
United States, where the establishment of the public health insurance
schemes in 1965, Medicare and Medicaid, supported and encouraged
the growth of private hospitals (Collyer & White 2001, p. 4). Over the
subsequent decade, the for-profit hospital sector in that country grew
by 55 percent compared with only 28 percent for the non-profit sector
(Sax 1990). Publicly funded insurance schemes guarantee government
income for the medical profession, and given this would otherwise rep-
resent the greatest expense to a hospital, provides a significant incentive
for investors to enter the healthcare sector.
The rise of the corporate hospital
In Australia, the entry of corporate capital into the healthcare services
sector would eventually – and profoundly – alter the provision of ser-
vices as diverse as pathology laboratories and general practice. It was
hospitals, however, that were the first to show the effects of marketisa-
tion. The Australian hospital system has unique characteristics and a
unique history. Unlike the European model with its basis in religious
and private hospitals, the earliest hospitals in this country were military
facilities, catering for convicts and military personnel (Daniel 1990, p.
71). The first non-military hospitals were state-owned facilities, created
in 1848, seven years after the end of convict transportation and the for-
mal handing over of the military hospitals to government for the use
of civilians (Hicks 1981, p. 6). This event also followed the first Hospi-
tals Act 1847, where although government took the major responsibility
for the cost, hospitals were provided with the autonomy to receive do-
nations and own land (Hicks 1981, p. 6). In contrast to England and
Europe, religious and philanthropic hospitals only started to appear in
Australia in the middle of the 19th century, as did the private hospitals
(Daniel 1990, p. 71; Hicks 1981, pp. 6–7). Moreover, all hospital types
were given some government funding, particularly the religious ones
(Hicks 1981, p. 6; Sax 1984, p. 25), and historically this has remained
the case, with all Australian hospitals relying heavily on government
subsidies (Gray 1996, p. 589).
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Until the mid-1970s, however, state funding was uncertain and
irregular, varying enormously across jurisdictions, and subject to radi-
cal change with shifts in government, preventing hospital boards from
effectively planning for expansion or renewal. While the Australian La-
bor Party has always supported the principle of public hospitals, private
hospitals (with minimal subsidy) have been the preference of the con-
servative parties (Gray 1996, p. 590). Thus the renewed support for
public hospitals introduced by the Australian Labor Party in the 1940s,
ended in the 1950s (Gray 1996, p. 591). Only with the introduction
of Medibank, which provided a regular and secure funding basis for
hospitals for the first time (Collyer 2012, pp. 128–29; Whitlam 1968),
were the large, publicly owned and publicly run institutions able to
strengthen and become dominant features of the healthcare system.
From the mid-1980s, however, investors began purchasing the nu-
merous, owner-operated, small private hospitals offering a limited
range of services and interspersed throughout the sector. Some in-
vestors built new facilities, often luxurious, with an eye to attracting
offshore clientele, and sometimes co-located with a large public hospital
(Bloom 2000; Brown & Barnett 2004). There were also purchases of
some larger, publicly owned institutions, and investors entered into
commercial contracts with governments to manage and/or build these
‘public’ hospitals (Collyer 1997; Collyer & White 2001; Collyer, Wetten-
hall & McMaster 2003; Collyer, McMaster & Wettenhall 2001).
The result was a rapid concentration of hospital ownership in Aus-
tralia, with a few large corporations purchasing, building, or otherwise
owning ‘chains’ of sizeable hospitals (White & Collyer 1998, p. 492).
This new hospital landscape emerged with an overall growth in the
number of private hospitals from the early 1990s (from 430 in 1991–92
to 593 in 2010–11), and a ‘modest contraction’ in the number of public
hospitals (758 in 1991–92, 752 in 2010–11) (an issue discussed in detail
below). Table 8.2 shows the change in the relative number of private
and public hospitals between 1991–92 and 2010–11, indicating the
rapid growth of the private, free-standing, day hospital facilities over
the same period.
A similar pattern of change in the hospital sector can be seen in
the figures for hospital ‘separations’ (that is, episodes of care). Between
1995–96 and 2004–05 these increased for all hospitals by 35.7 percent.
In the public sector the increase was 19.5 percent (acute hospitals),
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Table 8.2: Hospital sector growth 1991–2011. For sources and notes, see appendix
at the end of the chapter
Sector and type of hospital 1991–2 1996–7 2001–2 2006–7 2010–11
Public hospitals (acute and psy-
chiatric)
758 729 746 758 752
Private hospitals (acute and psy-
chiatric)
319 319 301 289 279
Private free-standing day hospital
facilities 111
* 153 246 268 314
Total private hospitals 430 472 547 557 593
but it was a much larger 73.8 percent in the private sector (including
free-standing day facilities) (AIHW 2006, p. x). We can best examine
these changes over time in terms of ‘bed’ numbers, a ready measure
of ‘throughput’. Table 8.3 indicates a remarkable growth in the number
of private hospital beds available in the Australian healthcare system
between 1991 and 2011. Bed numbers in the public sector have not in-
creased to the same extent over the same period.
The ‘modest contraction’ or lack of growth in the public hospital
sector needs further explanation, as it is of significance to the story of
corporate growth and consolidation. Hospitals ‘lost’ to the public sec-
tor over the period were primarily psychiatric hospitals. Two were the
result of administrative changes (with three hospitals in Tasmania be-
coming one ‘reporting unit’ in 2009–10), and others closed or sold in
the process of de-institutionalisation. The number of acute hospitals in
the public sector has remained fairly stable, in part due to the growth
and preference for day surgery (where medically appropriate). Yet these
hospital statistics do not reveal the number of ‘public hospitals’ now
owned and/or managed by the private sector, where ‘public’ patients
are admitted under contract to government. Such hospitals are classi-
fied as ‘public’ within the ABS and AIHW collections, and its patients
identified only as public or private.7 In other words, there is no separate
7 ‘A public hospital is defined as one that is operated by, or on behalf of, the
government of the state or territory in which it is established. This includes
hospitals which are owned by private or charitable groups but are authorised or
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Table 8.3: Available hospital ‘beds/chairs’ 1991–2011
Sector and type of hospital 1991–92 1996–97 2001–2 2006–7 2010–11
Public hospital (acute and psy-
chiatric) beds
57,053 56,836 51,461 55,904 57,772
Private free-standing day hos-
pital beds
– 1,163 1,851 2,251 2,957
Other private hospital beds – 22,966 25,556 24,427 25,394
Total private hospital beds 19,923 24,129 27,407 26,678 28,351
Source: Compiled from ABS (1995) for 1991–92 data and AIHW (2002, 2003,
2012b, 2013b) with AIHW Australian Hospital Statistics reports for other years
also consulted.
category for these privately owned/managed ‘public’ hospitals, nor a
category for ‘publicly admitted patients’ who represent a profit-making
unit for the corporations concerned. Hence what appears to be a ‘mod-
est contraction’ of the public hospital sector in fact obscures another
area of growth in corporate activity – at the cost of state-owned facilities
and state-provided care. Moreover, the financial costs of these activities
to the state are not available for public scrutiny, as they are only docu-
mented in the commercial-in-confidence contracts these corporations
have with state governments, and details are not provided even under
freedom of information requests. This is a problem of privatisation and
has been evident also in the United Kingdom, the United States (White
& Collyer 1998, p. 503) and Canada (Whiteside 2013).
Integration and concentration in health services
These dramatic changes to the Australian hospital sector eventually
began to have ramifications for other health services as the hospital
corporations began to diversify through ‘vertical integration’: the pur-
chasing of radiology and pathology testing laboratories, general prac-
tices (White & Collyer 1998; White 2000) and even pharmaceutical
contracted by the government to deliver public hospital services’ (Productivity
Commission 2009).
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and research facilities (Collyer 2004). Since 2000 there has been an in-
creasing consolidation of the medical market and a concentration of
ownership, with ongoing corporatisation, consolidation and integra-
tion of pathology companies and diagnostic imaging, and both vertical
and horizontal integration of companies and services. For instance, be-
tween January 2000 and June 2001, the corporate share of the private
radiology market jumped from less than 10 percent to an estimated 46
percent, dominated by Medical Imaging Australasia (20 percent share),
Sonic Health Care (12 percent), Mayne (10 percent) and I-Med (eight
percent) (Quinlivan 2001); and by 2010 the top four public corpora-
tions’ share of the private radiology market was above 60 percent (Jones
2010). In pathology, four companies had a 79 percent share of the pri-
vate market by 2005 (Sonic 36 percent; Mayne 30 percent; Healthscope
nine percent; Primary Health Care four percent). In 2009, following
Primary Health Care’s acquisition of Mayne’s pathology interests, the
remaining three accounted for 86 percent share, with the non-profit, St
John of God, having an additional five percent share (NEHTA 2009).
Companies in both radiology and pathology benefit from the size-
able flow of Medicare funding (Quinlivan 2001). Diagnostic imaging
services for example, which include ultrasound, magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) and computed tomography (CT scans), constitute six
percent of all medical claims to Medicare, and expenditure on these
services represents $2.15 billion or 14 percent of the Medicare budget
(Medical Benefits Reviews Task Group 2012, p. 4). These technologies
are distributed across both sectors (for example, 76 MRI machines are
in private and 49 in public settings (see Medical Benefits Reviews Task
Group 2012, p. 4), and public funding, via Medicare, is provided for
both capital and recurrent costs on a fee-for-service basis for both pub-
lic and private patients.
The arena of general practice demonstrates the complexity of pri-
vatisation in healthcare provision. When Medibank was devised in the
early 1970s, no attempt was made to alter the fee-for-service nature of
this sector. Most GPs operate their own, or work within a private prac-
tice, and the introduction of the Medibank system only altered their
method of payment, not their status as private sector, self-employed
workers. This status nevertheless shifted with the corporatisation of
general practice. This began in the 1980s and 1990s with the luxuriously
decorated high-traffic ‘super clinics’ established by the doctor and en-
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trepreneur, Geoffrey Edelsten, quickly followed by various competitors
including Viscount Holdings (Collyer & White 2001, p. 11). The rate of
corporatisation has since settled into a more sustainable pattern, with
three main companies involved in their ownership (down from seven
in 2007). Two are listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX),
and are among the top 100 companies: Sonic Healthcare and Primary
Health Care. Sonic leads in terms of market capitalisation ($5.3 billion),
followed by Primary ($1.8 billion) (ASX 2012). A third large company,
the Healthscope Group, though de-listed from the ASX in 2010 with its
acquisition by transnationals (The Carlyle Group and TPG, both with
headquarters in North America), also owns medical centres in Aus-
tralia, alongside its pathology and hospital businesses.
In this industry sub-sector, medical centres represent a business
opportunity. Medicare benefits paid by the federal government for gen-
eral practice (across the industry sector) totalled $4.2 billion for the
year ending June 2012 (Healthscope 2013, p. 47). There are approxi-
mately 9,380 medical centres and over 27,000 GPs in Australia, and 12
percent of the latter work for either Independent Practitioner Network
Ltd (IPN) (Sonic’s general practice company since 2008), Primary or
Healthscope. The Healthscope Group owns and operates 46 medical
centres in Australia (Healthscope 2013, p. 54). Primary Health Care,
which acquired Mayne Nickless’ health assets in 2008, operates 58
large-scale medical centres (Primary Health Care 2013) and IPN man-
ages over 190 multi-disciplinary medical centres around Australia (IPN
2011; Sonic Healthcare 2011).
During the early 2000s, corporate medical centres appeared to be
unprofitable ventures, with their commercial value primarily in the
generation of referrals to pathology and diagnostic services owned
by the same vertically integrated companies (Jones 2007). It was also
thought that many GPs, while valuing the management and support
services provided in corporate practice, were averse to restrictions to
their clinical autonomy that might be entailed in making for-profit cor-
poratisation profitable (Anderson et al. 2005). In this second decade of
the millennium, the sub-industry has consolidated, with medical cen-
tres a staple of the larger, for-profit, healthcare sector.
The ownership of private hospitals, and the provision of hospital
services, are other significant businesses in the corporate healthcare
sector. In Australia there are currently 1,345 hospitals (including free-
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standing day hospital facilities), with public hospitals constituting, at
most, 56 percent of these.8 This has been reduced from its 1991 level of
65 percent, when there were 1,188 hospitals, and public hospitals were
the dominant form. Within the corporate hospital sector, there are two
leading hospital operators: Ramsay Health Care and the Healthscope
Group. Both are large companies, with Ramsay Health Care listed on
the ASX (with $4.8 billion in market capitalisation and revenues of $2.1
billion for the whole group), and the Healthscope Group, the second
largest hospital operator, with revenues of $2.1 billion (Healthscope
2013, p. 14). Ramsay’s Australian hospital portfolio includes a total of
66 hospitals and day facilities (Ramsay 2012a), including many ‘public’
hospitals – such as the Mildura Base Hospital in Victoria, the Joondalup
Health Campus in Perth, and the Peel Health Campus in Western Aus-
tralia – that it has built or operates as public–private partnerships with
state governments. Healthscope has a portfolio of 44 private hospitals
across Australia, and its hospital division generates its largest propor-
tion of revenues. Six of its hospitals are co-located with large public
teaching hospitals, three are operated on behalf of the Adelaide Com-
munity Healthcare Alliance, and a further 11 are leased (Healthscope
2013, p. 52).
The corporate hospital market in Australia is thriving. Although
there has not been a growth in the number of for-profit companies
owning and/or managing hospitals since the 1980s, these companies
have nevertheless grown in size and extended their operations into all
areas of healthcare, including laboratories and rehabilitation services.
And while some companies are independent, owning only one hos-
pital, others are ‘group’ or ‘chain’ operations. In 1986 there were 14
for-profit groups, owning an average of six hospitals each. By 2002, the
11 for-profit groups owned an average of 12 hospitals, with 104 between
them (O’Loughlin 2002, p. 106). By 2013, over 120 of the 593 private
hospitals are for-profit hospitals, including those owned by Ramsay
(52 hospitals), Healthscope (44), Healthe Care (12) and Independent
Private Hospitals (seven), as well as numerous independent hospital
operators. The ‘group’ sector continues to grow. Indeed, the Manag-
8 The phrase ‘at most’, is used at this point to remind readers that the ABS and
AIHW ‘public’ category for hospitals does not take into account the number of
hospitals owned or managed by the private sector.
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ing Director of Ramsay, Christopher Rex, suggested in a February 2012
ASX Announcement that ‘given the emerging theme of public/private
partnerships, the role of the private sector could grow even further’
(Ramsay 2012b).
The politics of health service reform
Support for public, universal, compulsory health insurance has long
been a feature of Australian Labor governments. Likewise, Labor has
historically shown a greater preference for supporting the public hos-
pital system and providing public healthcare services. Nevertheless, the
reshaping of the healthcare services landscape through marketisation
and corporatisation has been the product of the action of all major
parties – albeit unequally – at both Commonwealth and state gov-
ernment levels. The Coalition’s new-found support for Medicare from
1996 (alongside a strengthened advocacy for private health insurance),
was only marginally pre-dated by another significant shift, this time
legislative, introduced in 1993 by the Keating Labor Commonwealth
government (1991–96). Charged with the responsibility for managing a
highly complex private-public system that has never been able to effec-
tively cap medical fees, the government’s response to continually rising
costs was to amend the Health Insurance Act 1973 and the National
Health Act 1953, to allow third parties to sign contracts with individual
doctors or hospitals so that health services could be supplied for fixed
fees.
This legislation enabled health insurance companies (or other bod-
ies such as unions or employer groups) to offer direct contracts with
hospitals (which could then sign up appropriate specialists) for services
supplied to their members. It also allowed the insurance funds to offer
‘gap’ coverage to members, and limit this to members treated in the hos-
pitals nominated by the funds. The legislation provided greater power
to the insurance companies to negotiate with practitioners and hospi-
tals, altering their previously passive role in price setting, shifting the
risk to the hospitals themselves by changing the means by which the
funds pay the hospitals from a bed day to per-episode basis, and in
turn, encouraging investors to purchase several hospitals to improve
their bargaining strength (O’Loughlin 2002, p. 113). The private hos-
pitals and new hospital ‘chains’ also responded by strategically seeking
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opportunities for vertical integration, increasing the possibility of cor-
porate control over the referral process. Such changes occurred rel-
atively quickly, even though the contract system itself has not been,
and remains, unpopular with doctors. The resistance to contracts is
largely the result of its strong parallels with the American health sys-
tem, where Health Maintenance Organisations combine insurance with
the provision of services, and hence control access to services as well
as determining the nature of services provided. Concern about the
imposition of an American-style health system in Australia, with its re-
strictions on the autonomy of doctors, led to a sustained level of public
outrage led by the AMA and the Doctors Reform Society (Collyer &
White 2001, pp. 11–12). Under the Howard government, concessions
were made to the professions to allow non-contractual agreements with
funds, and to the providers, enabling hospitals to obtain the same ben-
efits where no contracts were entered into (Shamsullah 2011, p. 29).
Despite this reform, professional resistance continues and few contracts
have been finalised.
The legislation also increased the capacity of state governments to
introduce market principles into the healthcare services sector. State
governments have traditionally played a key role in encouraging in-
vestment and managing hospitals and other services within their juris-
diction. Thus the flood of corporate investment into the sector during
the 1980s and 1990s was welcomed and actively encouraged by vari-
ous state governments (Collyer & White 2001). For example, the Liberal
Greiner (1988–92) and Fahey (1992–95) governments in New South
Wales (NSW) sold most of the state psychiatric hospitals and closed
hundreds of public hospital beds. They promoted the construction of
new private hospitals, and put out tenders for 24 hospital co-location
opportunities on public hospital campuses (Bloom 2000, p. 236). Like-
wise the Liberal Kennett government in Victoria (in power 1992–99),
was responsible for the closure of many public hospitals and the use
of market mechanisms to ‘reform’ public services: including the in-
troduction of a casemix system of funding hospitals and widespread
competitive tendering (Collyer & White 2001, p. 5).
While the privatisation of healthcare services slowed with the sub-
sequent election of Labor state governments in NSW (Carr/Iemma/
Rees/Keneally, 1995–2011) and Victoria (Bracks/Brumby, 1999–2010),
it did not stop. A particular focus has been hospitals built – and oper-
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ated – through public–private partnerships, of which there were 12 in
Australia by December 2006 (four each in NSW and Victoria, two in
Western Australia and one each in Queensland and Tasmania) (English
2006). Data about the extent of hospital public–private partnerships
in Australia is severely limited, but they continue to be created in
most states of Australia, particularly, but not exclusively, where Liberal
or Coalition governments are in power. The Bracks Labor govern-
ment established Partnerships Victoria, which oversaw public–private
partnerships for the construction of several hospitals including the
Casey Community Hospital (opened 2004), Royal Women’s Hospital
(opened 2008), the new Royal Children’s Hospital Project (2011) and
the New Bendigo Hospital (Partnerships Victoria 2012). The election
of a conservative Liberal Coalition government in Western Australia
in 2008 (led by Colin Barnett) led to the renewal of a privatisation
agenda and the significant contracting out of labour and services at
a series of public hospitals, including the Albany, the Midland, the
Royal Perth and the Fiona Stanley hospitals. In Queensland in 2012,
under the Newman Coalition government, Exemplar Health won the
tender to design, finance, construct and maintain (for 25 years) the
Sunshine Coast University Hospital under a public–private partner-
ship, and Ramsay Health Care given the right to build, operate and own
a private hospital on the same site (Queensland Health 2012). In South
Australia, under the Rann Labor government, a public–private part-
nership with a 35-year contract was used to build and finance the new
Royal Adelaide Hospital (South Australia Health 2011); and the NSW
Liberal government, despite the failure of its previous for-profit, pub-
lic–private partnership (the Port Macquarie Base Hospital, see Collyer
1997), announced plans in 2013 for a public–private partnership for the
new Frenchs Forest public hospital.
Some implications for the healthcare system
Over the past 100 years, the public–private balance of the Australian
healthcare system has altered as successive governments, with distinct
philosophical and ideological perspectives, have pursued diverse policy
and financing strategies. In recent decades however, an entirely new
system began to emerge with the adoption – by both major parties –
of the NPM agenda and amidst the rhetoric and free-market ideologies
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of neoliberalism. Key principles of this reform program have included
minimising the role of government in the provision of services, and
funding institutions based on outcomes rather than inputs. Reforms
have focused on ‘the sale of public assets; the adoption of market mod-
els and competitive management and information reporting systems
for a wide range of public sector organisations’ (English 2005, p. 94).
In the Australian case, these have been combined with an increasing
preference for using social tax expenditures as a policy mechanism
(such as the private health insurance rebate). These operate as fiscal
welfare to the wealthier segments of society but at the same time allow
governments to promote markets and support private firms (Stebbing
& Spies-Butcher 2010, pp. 591–93; see also Meagher & Wilson and
Stebbing, in this volume). Various policies of Australian governments,
based on this agenda, have enabled the growth of corporate healthcare,
bringing a qualitatively different approach to the financing of services
and a reshaping of the system’s structure and form. The new system is
unlike its predecessor because the clear distinctions between the pub-
lic and private sectors, which had developed by the middle of the 20th
century, and the once dominant position of the public sector, have now
given way to a more even spread of healthcare services across the pub-
lic, for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, with increasing activity in the
for-profit sector. Differences between the tasks performed by the public
and private sectors are less apparent than they once were. In the past,
private hospitals rarely offered a full range of services, but tended to
specialise in a small number of surgical procedures, particularly elective
surgeries (Productivity Commission 2009, p. 56). Moreover, few pro-
vided emergency department services, undertook research or clinical
training for health and medical staff and students, or assumed the com-
munity functions of their public counterparts (Brown & Barnett 2004,
p. 428). In contrast, the public hospitals had a full range of specialist
units (such as domiciliary care, obstetrics and maternity, alcohol, drug
and coronary care units) as well as undertaking the clinical research
and training activities essential for sustaining the hospital sector, deter-
mining best practice, and setting its quality and standards.
Although the large metropolitan public hospitals continue to offer
the full range of services, new funding mechanisms (such as casemix)
have provided the financial incentive for the private sector to improve
its services (O’Loughlin 2002, p. 113). Government has also encouraged
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the broadening of the operations of the private hospitals and broken
down distinctions between the two sectors – particularly with regard
to research and training activities – with programs such as the Ex-
panded Specialist Training Program (Productivity Commission 2009,
pp. 59–60). In addition, the private hospital sector has actively re-
sponded to pressures for diversification, with some now including
emergency departments. Although this particular development is
mostly restricted to the densely populated metropolitan areas, it is the
result of several pressures, including the rising expectations of insured
patients who prefer not to attend a public hospital in an emergency. It
has been adopted by a small number of private hospitals as a means
to source new patients for the hospital independently of the specialists;
as a strategy to attract new specialists by offering them a more diverse
casemix and complexity; and as a way of financing a medical staff pres-
ence 24 hours per day (Productivity Commission 2009, pp. 60–61). The
distinction between the two sectors has been further blurred with the
advent of the privatised public hospitals and the use of government
contracts with the not-for-profit sector to operate public hospitals with
a full range of facilities. The full extent of this latter development how-
ever, is obscured by the inclusion of these hospitals within the category
of ‘public’ hospitals within all official statistical collections, including
those of the Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare.
Another feature distinguishing the current healthcare system from
previous iterations is its rapidly diminishing universality. The growth in
private health insurance membership over the past decade has attracted
larger numbers of patients into the private sector, leaving individuals
without private insurance, and without the means to pay for private
healthcare, in the public system (Moorin & Holman 2006, pp. 248–49).
With elective surgery increasingly being moved into the private hos-
pitals (Griffith 2006, p. 42), and the higher remuneration of surgeons
operating in private hospitals (Duckett 2005, p. 88), a two-tier system
has developed, whereby the least wealthy – and those most in med-
ical need of services – are denied access to timely surgery. While the
increase in private hospital usage is often seen as a positive outcome
for the healthcare budget, and phrased in terms of ‘taking the load
off the public sector’; this is a controversial change. The total amount
contributed to the health bill by the private health insurance sector
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has continued to fall (Kay 2007, p. 587), the relative levels of funding
to the public sector have dropped and the amount contributed by in-
dividual patients has risen. Yet at the same time, the government’s
subsidy of the industry has increased (Griffith 2006, p. 22). Hence the
subsidy is rapidly becoming a ‘significant and rising fiscal burden for
the Commonwealth Government’ (Peter Dawkins in Griffith 2006, p.
39). Clearly, the movement of patients into the private sector has not
reduced the healthcare costs to either government or the individual pa-
tient, nor assisted the public hospitals. The planning of these ‘reforms’
was based not on evidence but on assumptions about the greater effi-
ciency of the private sector, for there is little evidence of any savings
to the healthcare budget from the private health insurance subsidies
(Duckett & Jackson 2000; McAuley 2005; Richardson & Segal 2004),
or from public–private partnership schemes in the healthcare sector
(Acerete, Stafford & Stapleton 2012; English 2005). Such schemes are
ostensibly introduced to reduce public expenditures:
[y]et greater profit making for private partners and contractors does
not necessarily translate into lower costs for taxpayers, especially
when hospital infrastructure is privately financed. P3s [pub-
lic–private partnerships] are often used by government to avoid up-
front capital expenses and as a way of shifting costs and risks away
from the public sector – however higher interest rates, hidden fees,
inadequate or misleading risk transfer, and higher private partner
overhead costs all add up, producing more expensive infrastructure
and services over the long run (Whiteside 2013).
The increasing government support of the private healthcare sector also
removes resources from the public system. In a small market such as
Australia, where almost all surgeons operate in both the public and the
private sectors, increases in the level of private sector work (particu-
larly where it is for private patients and elective surgery) diminishes
the profession’s capacity to attend to those in the public sector (Duckett
2005, p. 88). And it is the public sector which cares for a much larger
proportion of patients with relatively low socioeconomic status and
more complex medical needs (Productivity Commission 2009, p. 29,
55). Moreover, instead of reducing public waiting lists, growth in the
use of the private sector may have the opposite effect because the higher
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remuneration of private hospitals provides surgeons with a ‘perverse in-
centive to maintain high waiting times in the public sector to encourage
prospective patients to seek private care’ (Duckett 2005, p. 88; also Pratt
2005).
The new healthcare system is fundamentally different in yet an-
other way. Although the two sectors may be becoming more alike with
regard to their functions, their historically divergent operational mo-
tives, incentives and responsibilities have been brought into tension.
Under the NPM agenda, and triggered by the signing of the 1995
National Competition Policy (NCP) – which bound state and federal
governments to the ‘competitive norms and rules’ of the private sector
(English 2005, p. 95) – corporate medical facilities and the expansion
of for-profit insurance firms were ushered into the Australian market-
place. Under the NCP, a ‘competitive neutrality between the private and
public sectors became enshrined in law’ (English 2005, p. 95). In other
words, governments are compelled to ignore the diverse operational
motives of the two sectors.
This largely explains the lack of parliamentary debate about the ex-
tent to which health funding is ending up in the private sector. Where
previous Commonwealth and state health budgets were primarily spent
on the provision of public services and the building of its infrastructure,
an increasing proportion of those budgets is now channelled into cor-
porate profits and other private surpluses. In 1990, for instance, private
hospitals received five percent of their total recurrent funds from the
Commonwealth. By 1999, it was providing 23 percent of their funds
(O’Loughlin 2002, p. 11). By 2009–10, this has risen to 33 percent
(AIHW 2012a, p. 4). With rising numbers of patients treated within the
for-profit hospital sector, and growth in the number of public hospitals
now under for-profit, private ownership and/or management, govern-
ment expenditures are rising. Indeed, corporations such as Ramsay
Health Care expect health expenditure, as a proportion of GDP, to in-
crease to 14.5 percent by 2050 (Rex 2013).
Despite this change to healthcare financing, corporate healthcare
has not been constituted as a policy ‘problem’ in need of a ‘solution’.
Yet the contrasting operational agendas of the two sectors lies at the
heart of this issue. Privately owned/managed hospitals have an incen-
tive to increase ‘throughput’ as they operate under a fee-for-service
funding model, and for-profit hospitals have a duty to maximise returns
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to shareholders/owners. In the not-for-profit sector, the revenue-gener-
ation motive is less obvious, but there is nevertheless an aim to avoid
losses (Productivity Commission 2009, p. 47).9 In the public sector, a
‘core function may be to assemble infrastructure, workforce and knowl-
edge around the care of patients to improve their health’ (Productivity
Commission 2009, p. 82), and the cost efficiency of its services is only
one of many concerns. Introducing marketisation into the healthcare
sector does not simply mean bringing in more private firms, but also
increasing the overall demand for services. This occurs because private
health insurance incentives raise expectations about the increased ca-
pacity of the private system, and thus in themselves increase demand
for services (Pratt 2005). It is also because there are greater incentives
in the private sector to clinically or surgically intervene and provide
services to patients. And there is evidence of ‘over-servicing’ in the
private sector. For example, patients admitted to private hospitals are
significantly more likely to receive intensive treatments, requiring more
specialists to be transferred out of the public sector (Richardson & Segal
2004, p. 40).
The new healthcare system then, is no longer government-driven
but market-shaped. Planning decisions are increasingly informed by
market considerations rather than medical need. Private facilities are
placed geographically to maximise revenue for corporate investors,
even where this will compete with local public services and duplicate
resources, leaving other regions undersupplied. This situation is cur-
rently occurring across Australia, because even while private hospital
beds are increasingly available in capital cities, they are being reduced
in regional areas where profitability is lower (Productivity Commission
2009, p. 65). Governments are unable to control the planning of ap-
propriate hospital facilities, because the legal framework within which
9 It should also be noted that organisations in the not-for-profit sector may have
their own agendas. While often considered to offer an alternative to the
profit-motive of the corporate hospitals, the institutional mission of the
not-for-profits can also shape the services they provide. For instance, the code of
ethics of Catholic Health Australia, Australia’s largest not-for-profit group
(Productivity Commission 2009), precludes direct provision or referrals for
abortion, some fertility treatments, vasectomy and other forms of sterilisation and
birth control, including for women who have been raped (Catholic Health
Australia 2001).
8 Money and markets in Australia’s healthcare system
283
claims are heard is based on the needs and property rights of entrepre-
neurs, not the user rights of patients or the service responsibilities of
government (Duckett 1989). Given that all medical services and hos-
pitals in Australia rely heavily on public funding, this situation wastes
scarce resources and produces no net gain in services for the com-
munity (White & Collyer 1998, p. 502). Equally, marketisation means
standards of accountability and transparency are weakened, with less
information provided about where the health budget is spent. This
is particularly apparent when funding is subject to the ‘commercial
confidentiality’ clauses of the public–private contracts, but also where
important government data collections have been discontinued (in-
cluding class-based disease categories and mortality rates) or simply
not updated, obscuring the role and impact of radical changes in the
healthcare system.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a description and analysis of how the Aus-
tralian healthcare system has developed since European settlement, and
its radical transformation over the past three decades. The focus has
been two areas within the healthcare system: the national insurance
scheme of Medicare and its private health insurance counterpart, and
the private and public hospital sectors. These areas are closely linked
in the private sector, given that the health funds are a major source of
a private hospital’s revenue, and hospital services constitute most of a
fund’s expenditures. Our analysis has concentrated on the private sec-
tor, particularly the role of the large, for-profit corporations rather than
the small independent private entities, religious institutions and not-
for-profit insurance schemes. This is because there has been relatively
little discussion or analysis of corporate healthcare in the Australian set-
ting, even though it has been the most significant development since
the introduction of Medibank.
Corporate healthcare has, as we have seen, brought a new com-
plexity to an already complex healthcare system. Prior to their entry,
the mixed system contained private, primarily not-for-profit religious
providers of healthcare services and not-for-profit insurance services.
With the growth in corporate healthcare and for-profit insurance com-
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panies, new administrative and regulatory processes have become es-
sential. For instance, in the hospital sector, the introduction of pub-
lic–private partnerships and contracts to care for public patients has
forced governments to create new regulatory and monitoring mecha-
nisms to ensure comparable quality across all services, and new pro-
grams and policies to ensure sufficient medical and specialist training
positions. Corporate, for-profit healthcare has also transformed the
landscape of the services sector, creating new scarcities within the pub-
lic system, new demands on the healthcare budget, new obstacles to
the efficient planning of services, and new constraints on the provision
of information and the maintenance of previously high standards of
transparency and accountability. In this new healthcare system, market
actors and market principles have a much larger role than ever before.
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Appendix
Sources and notes to Table 8.2.
• Compiled from ABS (1995) and AIHW (1999) for 1991–92 data and
AIHW (2002, 2003 [updated version of table 2.1], 2012b, 2013b)
with AIHW Australian Hospital Statistics reports for other years also
consulted. It should be noted that each hospital is a reporting unit
rather than necessarily one separate building, and there has been
some variance in administrative definitions over the period above.
* Figures for these facilities in 1991–92 are not available, hence
1993–94 figures are supplied as an indicator of growth in this sub-
sector.
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